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This report summarizes the most significant Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) deals and
developments of 2004' in the following jurisdictions: the United States, Canada, Europe,
and China.
I. United States
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activity in the United States increased in 2004. The
financial markets and corporate America, in general, made headway in recovering from the
crises in public confidence that surrounded the Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco,
HealthSouth, and other prominent collapses of the past few years. Public companies and
their boards of directors also made significant progress in adapting to the new regulatory
landscape (namely, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and related SEC regulations and new
stock market rules).
The United States saw its fair share of high-value deals in 2004, including Bank of Amer-
ica/Fleet (which closed in 2004 and was valued at $47 billion), JPMorgan/Bank One (valued
at over $58 billion), Cingular/AT&T Wireless (valued at $41 billion), and Sears/Kmart
(valued at $11 billion), as well as significant activity in regional banks, such as Regions/
Union Planters (in the South and Midwest), Citizens/Charter One (in New England and
the Mid-Atlantic), and North Fork/Green Point (in the Northeast), and in the technology
sector, including Netscreen Technologies/Juniper Networks (valued at $4 billion) and
Apogent/Fisher Scientific (valued at $3.7 billion). In addition, the spate of hostile activity
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coordinated by Victor Xercavins Lluch, of Cuatrecasas New York resident partner. Section IV was contributed
by Tang Yue of Jun He Law Offices.
1. This summary discusses the regulatory developments and mergers and acquisitions transactions that oc-
curred during the time period commencing at the end of year 2003 and ending at that end of year 2004.
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from 2003 (e.g., Peoplesoft/Oracle, ArvinMeritor/Dana and SimonfTaubman) continued
in 2004, with Comcast's failed $50 billion hostile offer for Disney and continuing activity
on Peoplesoft/Oracle (which finally ended with Oracle prevailing in a negotiated deal).
Some of the more significant trends and developments of 2004 are briefly described below.
These are expected to have a continued impact on M&A in the United States and abroad
in the coming year.
A. PRIVATE EQUITY AS A KEY M&A PLAYER
The year 2004 witnessed a continuing surge in private equity activity in the United States.
Financial sponsors announced acquisitions of over $290 billion in value, compared with
approximately $185 billion in 2003. Private equity groups, either alone or in consortia with
other private equity firms (or even hedge funds) and/or strategic buyers, were involved in
many significant transactions in 2004, including Texas Pacific Group's and Providence Eq-
uity Partners' backing of Sony Corporations' $5 billion acquisition of Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer; the purchase of Warner Music Group by Edgar Bronfman and various private equity
groups for $2.6 billion; the purchase of the Eckerd drugstore chain for $4.5 billion; and
transactions involving Boise Cascade (valued at $3.7 billion), Select Medical (valued at $2.3
billion), and Refco Group (valued at $2.3 billion).
Private equity firms have increasing amounts of committed, available capital under man-
agement, and as the amount of capital that is infused into these funds increases, a growing
number of firms will compete for key transaction opportunities, likely resulting in the
targets getting better pricing. In addition, the window for investing relatively long-existing
funds of many firms is drawing to a close. These facts, combined with heightened and
diverse investment activities by hedge funds, augur a continued, prominent, and very active
role for these groups in the M&A landscape generally, and as participants in auction pro-
cesses, in particular.
The investors are financial rather than industry players and therefore have, in certain
respects, a different perspective on M&A transactions. At the outset they anticipate the exit
strategy, which increasingly has involved "flipping" the investment to another private equity
player relatively soon after completion of the transaction. In this environment, sellers must
understand the investment strategies of these financial players and structure transaction
agreements to address risks presented by such investments (for example, limiting, to the
greatest extent possible, financing contingencies and conditions that may present a risk to
the deal's closing). On the other side, pricing discipline, auction strategy, thorough due
diligence, and speed will have an even greater importance for buyers. Private equity buyers
have been, and will continue to be, impacted by the new regulatory environment, with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as one example, affecting private equity deals through its coverage
companies acquired by private equity firms using public debt financing.
B. THE POsT-SARBANES-OXLEY ENVIRONMENT
The wave of new rulemaking that followed Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Health-
South, and other high-profile meltdowns largely subsided by early 2004. The amended
governance rules enacted by the stock exchanges had, by then, been approved by the SEC
and the SEC had itself finalized nearly all of the rules and regulations that remained to be
promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Implementation and adaptation are now the
primary focus. Compliance was, and remains, at the forefront of corporate thinking.
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In the context of deal dynamics, the focus on compliance has created an even greater
emphasis on the exploratory and due diligence stages on getting to know the target and
understanding the issues that may lead to difficulties post-closing under the new regulations
or more generally in the current environment. This has especially been the case with what
is known as the "Section 404 reports." Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC
rules promulgated under that section require public companies (domestic and foreign alike)
to include in their annual reports a management report and an outside auditor attestation
to the report regarding the company's internal controls over financial reporting.' This so-
called Section 404 report must be included in annual reports starting with the annual reports
for the fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2005 (for most domestic filers). A company
that acquires another company must include the acquired company in its report on internal
controls. Although the new rules include some additional time with respect to an acquired
business, the Section 404 report need not cover the internal controls of businesses acquired
during the public company's fiscal year ending as of the date of the report if it is not possible
for management to conduct a timely assessment following the acquisition, though this lee-
way granted may not extend beyond one year after the acquisition, a key focus of due
diligence for acquirers now includes the target's internal controls and any control weak-
nesses or deficiencies.
Heightened regulatory requirements, however, have not been the only product of the
post-Sarbanes-Oxley era. The crisis in investor confidence that precipitated these regula-
tions has created an environment of skepticism regarding the corporate manager and di-
rector. The SEC is actively prosecuting corporate managers and directors for alleged
wrongdoing, ranging from false SEC filing certifications to alleged irregularities in financial
reporting. And recently, directors are starting to face the possibility of personal liability for
actions taken, or omissions made, during their watch. For egregious cases, we have already
seen directors paying out of their own pockets as a requirement for settling claims against
them, even where officer and director insurance policies still had available coverage. For
example, ten former WorldCom directors agreed earlier this year to pay as much as $18
million in total (which is approximately 20 percent of their combined net worth) and ten
former Enron directors agreed to pay an aggregate of $13 million to settle shareholder
lawsuits. At a state common law level, we have also seen an attempt to expand the personal
liability of directors, in the form of shareholder suits claiming a breach of "good faith." In
Delaware, for example, litigation is ongoing against former Walt Disney Co. directors
regarding an alleged breach of a duty of good faith relating to employment arrangements
involving the company's former president, Michael Ovitz.
The long-term implications of these developments remain to be seen. In the context of
deals, the heightened risk of liability could have a chilling effect on the willingness of
directors to engage in significant, company-transforming transactions.
C. DEAL PROTECTION
Concern that an agreed-upon deal will be lost to an interloper is common in any deal
and, indeed, "deal protection" typically is a critical part of negotiations in public company
transactions. A target's board typically will insist on a "fiduciary out" to terminate the
2. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2005); 17 CER. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274 (2005).
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agreement if the target receives a superior proposal from a third party. The acquirer, on
the other hand, will seek to protect the deal to the extent possible, insisting on assurances
that the transaction will be consummated. Many negotiated deals thus include some type
of deal protection arrangement. These can take various forms, from break-up fees with "no-
shop" clauses to cross-options or to agreements from significant shareholders of the target
to support the transaction.
In the Omnicare decision issued in 2003, a sharply divided Delaware Supreme Court
enjoined a merger between Genesis Health Ventures and NCS Healthcare, holding that
the approval by the NCS board of voting agreements of significant shareholders that en-
sured shareholder approval of the proposed merger, together with a provision in the merger
agreement requiring the board to submit the merger agreement to a shareholder vote even
in the event of a competing offer and the absence of a "fiduciary out" for the NCS board,
precluded the NCS directors from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to shareholders.' Subse-
quent Delaware jurisprudence has given some clarity to the boundaries of impermissible
lock-ups, namely, holding that lock-up arrangements are not permissible if as a result the
deal becomes a fait accompli. Some uncertainty on this topic remains, however, and even
though the fact pattern in Omnicare is not typical, it has continued to impact practitioners'
thinking regarding the limits of deal protections.
D. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
The scandals of the early 2000s have emboldened certain shareholder groups, politicians,
and commentators to call for even greater shareholder "empowerment," seeking, for ex-
ample, a more direct role in the nomination of directors and launching "withhold-the-vote"
campaigns if boards conduct the business of the company in a manner that is contrary to
the particular group's agenda.
In 2004, institutional shareholders continued, and to some degree have been successful
with, their attacks on, among other things, takeover defenses such as poison pills and stag-
gered boards. In addition, although significant transactions such as company mergers have
always been subject to the approval of shareholders, acquirers and targets must now, more
than ever, understand the position and concerns of significant and institutional shareholders
and recognize that they may have views and positions that can impact the vote on the
transaction. In June 2004, for example, the California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem launched a campaign to oppose the $16.4 billion merger between WellPoint Health
Networks and Anthem on the ground that excessive pay packages would be given to top
WellPoint executives. Also in 2004, the acquisition of MONY Group, a U.S. insurer, by
France's AXA Financial ran into trouble when dissident shareholders led by a hedge fund
shareholder of MONY, sought to enjoin the transaction, complaining not only that the sale
price was too low, but also that the transaction was poorly timed and driven by manage-
ment's self-interest. Although both transactions were ultimately approved by shareholders
and completed, these cases illustrate the significant role that institutional shareholders can
and have played in the M&A landscape.
M&A activity in 2004 reflected, to a large extent, a restoration of public confidence and
the recovery of our markets. We can expect 2005 to be a very active year for both negotiated
3. Omincare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
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and hostile transactions. And we can expect continuing focus and discussion on issues of
director liability, director fiduciary duties, and the role played by activist institutional
shareholders.
II. Canada
According to Crosbie & Company Inc.,4 the total value of announced transactions in the
third quarter of 2004 was $31.8 billion, bringing the cumulative year-to-date total to C$86.5
billion, the highest level of Canadian M&A activity since 2001. This was primarily driven
by cross-border transactions. All ten of the largest transactions announced this year were
cross-border deals, seven of which involved a Canadian company acquiring a foreign
interest.'
A. SIGNIFICANT M&A TRANSACTIONS IN 2004
Notable announced or completed transactions in 2004 included:
Manulife Financial Corp.'s acquisition ofJohn Hancock Financial Services, Inc. for C$18
billion; TD Bank Financial Group's U.S.$3.8 billion offer for a 51 percent stake in Bank-
north Group Inc.; proposed merger between Molson Inc. and Adolph Coors Co., valued
at approximately $4.5 billion; Jean Coutu Group's acquisition of 1,549 Eckerd drugstores
from J.C. Penny Company for $3.3 billion; Bain Capital's acquisition of the SuperPages
Canada directory for approximately $2 billion; Rogers Wireless Communication's acqui-
sition of Microcell Telecommunications valued at $1.08 billion.
B. M&A TRENDS
1. Increased Role of Institutional Shareholders
In 2004, institutional shareholders continued to play an important role in the Canadian
M&A landscape and successfully influenced the course of several transactions.6 Institutional
shareholders have made it clear that they will not hesitate to impose their views in circum-
stances where transactions are not in their best interests.
2. Antitrust Issues
With the trend towards corporate consolidation in many sectors, the competitive impli-
cations of mergers and acquisitions continued to assume critical importance in 2004 and
became, for certain transactions, the most time-consuming hurdle. What follows is a brief
summary of the prior notification requirements under Canada's Competition Act and of
the developments in competition policy and legislation.
3. Prior Notification Requirements
In Canada, competition matters are governed by Canada's Competition Act.7 The Act is
administered and enforced by the Commissioner of Competition, who heads the Compe-
tition Bureau, Canada's antitrust watchdog.
4. News Release, Crosbie & Co. Inc., Canadian M&A Activity-Third Quarter 2004: Steady Quarter Con-
tributing to Stellar Year (Nov. 15, 2004) available at http://www.crosbieco.com/PR-Q304.pdf.
5. Id.
6. Transactions of note: proposed merger of Wheaton River Minerals and IAMGOLD Corporation; Man-
itoba Telecom Services Inc.'s acquisition of Allstream Inc.; proposed merger of Molson Inc. and Adolph Coors
Co.
7. Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985).
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Whether a transaction is notifiable or not, the Commissioner has jurisdiction to review
and challenge a merger at any time within three years of its completion, on the ground that
the merger substantially lessens or prevents competition in a relevant antitrust product and
geographic market.
The Commissioner must be notified of transactions which exceed the following thresh-
olds (based on book values):'
(a) Size of the Parties Threshold: The parties to a transaction, together with their re-
spective affiliates, have assets in Canada exceeding $400 million or gross revenues
from sales in, from or into Canada, exceeding $400 million;
(b) Size of Transaction Threshold: A proposed acquisition of the assets in Canada of an
operating business (including, by way of an acquisition of shares, assets or an in-
terest in an unincorporated combination), where the value of the assets in Canada
or the annual gross revenues from sales in or from Canada generated from those
assets exceeds $50 million ($70 million for amalgamations); and
(c) Shareholding Threshold: In the context of a proposed acquisition of voting shares of
a corporation carrying on an operating business in Canada, the person(s) acquiring
the shares acquire an interest in the corporation exceeding either 20 percent in the
case of a public corporation, or 35 percent, in the case of a private corporation. If
the purchaser has already surpassed the applicable threshold and makes a subse-
quent share purchase that results in its owning more than a 50 percent interest,
the subsequent proposed transaction will, generally, also require notification.
If the transaction is notifiable, the parties have the option of filing a "short form" or
"long form" notification.9 Each of these forms differs substantially in the amount and detail
of required information. A notifiable transaction cannot be completed until the applicable
statutory waiting period (generally fourteen days for short form filings and forty-two days
for long form filings) has expired. In appropriate circumstances, parties to a transaction
may request an advance ruling certificate (ARC) from the Commissioner which exempts
the purchaser from the notification requirements and estops the Commissioner from chal-
lenging a completed transaction.
C. Developments in Competition Policy and Legislation
In September 2004, the Competition Bureau released the highly anticipated revised
Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs).0 The revised MEGs have replaced the MEGs
first published in 1991 as a comprehensive explanation of the Competition Bureau's merger
enforcement policy. The new MEGs reveal important refinements of the Competition Bu-
reau's approach and are conceptually very similar to U.S. antitrust principles.
D. Sarbanes-Oxley: Canada-Style!
Recent developments in Canadian securities laws reflect a global trend toward greater
legal accountability for directors of Canadian public companies and have had an impact on
8. R.S.C., ch. C-34 § 114(l).
9. R.S.C., ch. C-34 § 114(2).
10. Competition Bureau, Merger Enforcement Guidelines (2004), available at http://www.competition
bureau.gc.ca/intemet/index.cfin?itemID = 1245&lg = e
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M&A transactions. In particular, extensive due diligence has become a primary focus in
deals.
Three separate but related Multilateral Instruments (MIs)," introduced by a number of
Canadian securities regulators in March 2004, impose new rules on CEO and CFO certi-
fication of disclosure in public companies' annual and interim filings certification, the com-
position of audit committees and the new Canadian Public Accountability Board in its
oversight of auditors of public companies. The new rules on CEO and CFO certification
have created the most concern for corporate executives. Collectively, they form part of
Canada's response to the recent corporate governance and related reforms implemented in
the United States. The final rules are Canadian measures designed to restore investor con-
fidence. The belief is that they will be as robust as those implemented in the United States,
whilst designed to reflect the differences in the Canadian market, especially the significant
number of controlled companies and the generally smaller size and resources of Canadian
companies. As the state of the market continues to be favorable for M&A transactions, the
positive M&A trend will likely result in a significant number of interesting transactions in
2005.
I. Europe
Europe witnessed a flurry of M&A activity in 2004, with notable transactions including
the $80 billion unification of Royal Dutch and Shell Group; Sanofi Synthelabo's $60 billion
acquisition of Aventis, creating the world's third largest pharmaceutical company behind
Pfizer and Glaxo; Telecom Italia SpA's $28 billion buyout of minority shareholders in its
wireless unit, Telecom Italia Mobile SpA; General Electric's $10.6 billion takeover of
Amersham, the United Kingdom biosciences and diagnostics group; Pinault-Printemps-
Redoute's $2.9 billion acquisition of the remaining shares of Gucci Group which it did not
already own; and the pending leveraged buy-out by a private equity consortium electrical
equipment supplier Rexel from Pinault-Printemps-Redoute in a deal valued at E1.9 billion.
Perhaps the most significant development of 2004 on the M&A landscape in Europe was
Directive 2004/25/EC of the April 21, 2004 on takeover bids (Takeover Directive), with
which European Union (EU) Member States must be in compliance with by May 20,
2006.12 By adopting the Takeover Directive, the Member States sought to achieve a high
level of harmonization on the common and general requirements on takeover bids for all
Member States. However, implementation of some of the key provisions of the Takeover
Directive is optional for Member States, making achievement of a uniform compilation of
takeover rules throughout EU Member States difficult. Below is a brief summary of the
Takeover Directive.
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DIRECTIVE
Under article 3 of the Takeover Directive (General Principles) Member States must
comply with the following principles:" 3
11. National Instrument 52-108, Auditor Oversight, available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/nssc/docs/ni52-108.
pdf; Multilateral Instrument 52-109, Certification of Disclosure in Issuers' Annual and Interim Filings, available
at http://www.gov.ns.ca/nssc/docs/ni52-109jan202005.pdf; Multilateral Instrument 52-110, Audit Committees,
available at http://www.gov.ns.ca/nssc/docs/mi52-1 10.pdf.
12. Council Directive 2004/25/EC, 2004 Oj. (L 142) 12, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/
LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/1 142/ 14220040430en00120023 .pdf.
13. Id. art. 3.
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(a) Equivalent treatment: All holders of the securities of a target company of the same
class must be given equivalent treatment.
(b) Information rights and transparency of the markets: Shareholders of a target company
must be given sufficient time and information through an offer document to enable
them to reach a properly-informed decision on an offer. Certain specified infor-
mation is called for. False markets must not be created in the securities of target
companies.
(c) Defense of interests of the target and its shareholders: The board of directors of the
target company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and must not
deny the shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.
(d) Guarantees of the offer: An offeror may only announce a bid after ensuring that it
can pay in full any cash consideration it offers and after taking all reasonable mea-
sures to secure the implementation of any other type of consideration.
(e) Activity of the target companies: Target companies must not be hindered in the con-
duct of their affairs for longer than is reasonable by an offer for their securities.
Member States may also adopt additional conditions and more stringent provisions.
B. SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
Each Member State is required to designate an authority to supervise offers.14 The su-
pervisory authority may be (1) a supervisory authority of the Member State in which the
target has its registered office, if the securities are admitted to trading in that Member State
or (2) an authority of the Member State in which the regulated market where the securities
of the company are admitted to trading is located. It is highly likely that problems on shared
supervisory authorities may arise.
C. PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, THE MANDATORY BID AND THE EQUITABLE
PRICE
1. Mandatory Bid and Protection of Minority Shareholders
Pursuant to article 5 of the Takeover Directive, Member States must ensure that a man-
datory (and supervening) bid is made for a company if a person (or persons acting in concert)
acquires securities that, when added to any existing holdings of securities, result in the
offeror having a specified percentage of the voting rights of the company that give the
offeror control.'5 The bid must be made at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of
securities for all of their holdings. Where control has been obtained following a voluntary
bid to all the holders, the obligation to make a mandatory bid does not apply. Member
States in which the target has its registered office may define "control" (which is not defined
in the Takeover Directive) and determine the percentage of voting rights that confers
control.
2. Equitable Price
The Takeover Directive enhances shareholder rights by requiring an "equitable price"
for mandatory bids. 16 The "equitable price" is defined as the highest price paid for the same
14. Id. art. 4.
15. Id. art. 5.
16. Id. art. 5.
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securities by the offeror (or persons acting in its concert) over a period of no less than six
months and no more than twelve months prior to the bid. Member States may fix the period
within these parameters. If, after the announcement of the offer and before the acceptance
period has expired, the offeror (or any person acting in concert) purchases securities at a
higher price than the offer price, the offeror must increase its offer price to no less than
that higher price. However, as long as the general principles set forth in article 3 are re-
spected, supervisory authorities may be given discretion to adjust the price in certain cir-
cumstances and according to criteria clearly determined by Member States. Any decision
to adjust the equitable price must be substantiated and made public.
3. Consideration
The consideration in an offer may be securities, cash, or a combination." However, the
offeror must offer cash consideration (at least as an alternative) when the consideration does
not consist of liquid securities traded on a regulated market of a Member State. The Take-
over Directive also allows Member States to provide that a cash consideration must be
offered (at least as an alternative) in all cases.
D. OPTING OUT ARTICLES
In accordance with article 12 of the Takeover Directive, Member States may opt out of
paragraphs two and three of article 9, article 11, or both." These are, arguably, the two
most important provisions of the Takeover Directive. Article 9 prohibits the target from
taking defensive actions to frustrate bids. 19 From the moment a bid is public or the target's
board of directors is aware of a bid, the board must obtain shareholder approval before
taking any action other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in the frustration of
the bid. Article 11 allows offerors to break through restrictions on the transfer of shares
during the time allowed for acceptance of the offer and provides provisions for extraordinary
voting rights and multiple voting rights that have effect at the shareholders' meeting at
which defensive measures are voted upon of the target shareholders.20 In addition, if, fol-
lowing a bid, the offeror holds more than 75 percent of the voting rights of the offeree, no
restrictions on extraordinary voting rights or transfer of securities or rights of shareholders
to appoint or remove directors apply.
In all cases where rights are removed, equitable compensation must be provided for the
losses suffered by the holders of those rights. Where a Member State opts out of this
provision, it is left up to the companies to decide for themselves whether to apply it. Even
if a Member State chooses to opt out of this provision, companies located in that Member
State may choose to opt in. This situation, in the end, is likely to result in a high level of
uncertainty. If articles 9 or 11 are applied, Member States can exempt the relevant com-
panies from applying such articles if the offeror is not subject to the same restrictions.
E. SQUEEZE-OUT AND SELL-OUr RIGHTS
Member States must ensure that, where a bid has been made for all shares, squeeze-out
and sell-out rights apply pursuant to articles 15 and 16 of the Takeover Directive.
17. Id. art. 5(5).
18. Id. art. 12.
19. Id. art. 9.
20. Id. art. 11.
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1. Squeeze-Out
Under article 15, Member States are required to adopt one of the following mechanisms
to allow offerors who have made an offer to all the holders of the target company to compel
remaining minority shareholders to sell their securities:2'
(a) If, after the offer, the offeror holds securities representing not less than 90 percent
(or, at the discretion of each Member State, not less than 95 percent) of the target's
capital voting rights and not less than 90 percent (or, at the discretion of each
Member Sate, not less than 95 percent) of its voting rights; or
(b) if, following the acceptance of the bid, the offeror has acquired or firmly under-
taken to acquire securities representing not less than 90 percent of the target's
voting rights and 90 percent of the voting rights comprised in the offer.
The squeeze-out right must occur within three months of the end of the offer acceptance
period.
2. Sell-Out
Article 16 of the Takeover Directive provides that Member States must adopt rules to
enable minority holders of the remaining securities to sell their securities to the majority
shareholder, provided it has acquired the majority of its stake after a takeover bid and the
capital subsequendy held by the majority shareholder is the same as required by each Mem-
ber State pursuant to article 15 of the Takeover Directive.22 The same considerations con-
cerning fair price and timetable established for squeeze-outs apply.
IV. China
The most significant regulatory development in the area of M&A in 2004 relates to the
reform of the investment approval scheme. Under this scheme, any investment projects in
China are subject to the examination and approval of various levels of governmental au-
thorities based on the total investment involved in the project, regardless of the identities
of the investors and sources of capital. In July 2004 the State Council promulgated the mile-
stone "Decision on the Reform of Investment Administration System" (Reform Decision).23
In China, investment projects fall into one of two categories: projects funded by the
government and projects funded by enterprises and individuals. Under the new Reform
Decision, investment projects not using governmental funds are no longer subject to gov-
ernmental examination and approval. However, certain projects within this category that
are characterized as significant or restricted projects are still subject to the verification and
approval of the government. A list of the projects that are subject to the verification and
approval is attached to the Reform Decision. Compared with the previous examination
21. Id. art. 15.
22. Id. art. 16.
23. See, e.g., Chen Gang Sou, Reform of Investment System Deepened, News Guangdong, available at
http://www.newsgd.com/newslchinal/200412220105.htm (last updated July 27, 2004); China: State Council
Reform of the Investment System, Deacons, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.hg.org/articles/article-446.
html; Lan Xinzhen, Investor Friendly: More Freedom With the New Confirmation and Registration System
Bejing Review, available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200433/Business-200433(A).htm (last visited May 24,
2005).
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and approval process, the verification process is less burdensome and more transparent.
The government decides whether or not to a give green light to an investment project
based on public interests. The criteria used in the verification and approval include main-
tenance of economic security, reasonable utilization of natural resources, environmental
protection, optimization of the industry structure, and prevention of monopoly. All other
projects not included in the list are to be filed with the government but no prior govern-
mental approval is required.
Subsequent to the Reform Decision, the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion issued three administrative regulations governing the verification and approval of the
projects relating to investment made by foreign and domestic investors and overseas in-
vestment made by Chinese companies. 4 The three administrative regulations clarify the
specific requirements of the verification and approval procedure and provide a more detailed
guidance to investors.
A. SIGNIFICANT M&A TRANSACTIONS IN 2004
The 2004 transaction between HSBC and the Bank of Communications is the most
significant M&A deal in China's financing. On August 6, 2004, HSBC and the Bank of
Communications concluded their strategic alliance agreement by which HSBC will acquire
a 19.9 percent stake in the Bank of Communications for $1.747 billion. The Bank of Com-
munications was founded in 1987 and is the fifth largest commercial bank in China.
Through the end of June 2004, its total assets were valued at $12.7 billion and it ranks
eighty-seventh among the top 1000 banks worldwide, according to asset value. Upon com-
pletion of the transaction, HSBC will become the second largest shareholder of the Bank
of Communications, second only to the Ministry of Finance. HSBC will provide technical
support and services to the Bank of Communications in the areas of risk control, corporate
governance, financing management, assets and debt management, and human resources.
The two parties are also establishing a joint venture to focus on the credit card business.
The PRC law does not allow a foreign bank to hold more than 20 percent of the equity
interest in a Chinese bank. This deal is unprecedented in the financing industry both with
respect to the transaction amount ($1.747 billion) and the shareholding (19.9 percent) ac-
quired by a foreign bank.
China's fast-growing food and beverage market has attracted significant foreign invest-
ment interest. On December 27, 2003, Asahi and Itochu concluded a strategic alliance
agreement with Tingyin, a large instant noodle maker with significant Taiwanese invest-
ment. Under the strategic alliance agreement, Asahi and Itochu will acquire a 50 percent
equity interest in the beverage division of Tingyi. Tingyi has a 44 percent share of the
Chinese $1.95 billion litre instant tea market and ranks number one in the market. The
joint venture, with total assets of $950 million, will focus on the higher-margin soft-drink
market. Asahi, which has beer and soft-drink joint ventures with China's largest brewer,
Tsingtao Brewery, will contribute research and development capability to the joint venture,
while Tingyi will provide its production capacity and sales network.
24. See, e.g., Press Release, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, China Economic Regulations Update (Dec. 2004),
available at http://www.pwchk.com/webmedia/doc/1 10896748981 8-china-regulation-dec2004.pdf; Press Re-
lease, Beacon Law Firm, Corporate & Investment, available at http://www.beaconlaw.cn/ShowNews.asp?
ID= 54&Lang =EN (last visited May 25, 2005).
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In August 2004, Anheuser beat out SABMiller in an unprecedented take-over battle for
Harbin Brewery, a Chinese firm listed on Hong Kong stock exchange and China's fourth-
largest brewer, after Tsingtao, Yanjing, and China Resources. At the end of 2003, Anheuser
and SABMiller, respectively, held 29.07 percent and 29.41 percent of Harbin, with the
remainder in public hands. In a hostile offer in early May, SABMiller offered HK$4.30 per
share. In response, Anheuser offered a bid of HK$5.58 per share. Anheuser won the battle,
acquiring 99.91 percent in its general offer followed by a compulsory acquisition of the
remaining shares.
Large U.S. internet companies are now moving into China. Following Yahoo's acquisition
of 372 .com; e-Bay's acquisition of Eachnet; Sina Corporation's acquisition of MeMeStar;
and Chinadotcom's acquisition of NewPalm; in August 2004, Amazon announced its ac-
quisition of Joyo, the largest online retailer of books and audio-video products in China.
Amazon will acquire an 80 percent equity interest in Joyo's principal institutional share-
holders, Kingsoft Holdings and Legend Capital, for $75 million.
B. TRENDS OF M&A
M&A activity in China surged in 2004, evidencing that foreign investors are looking
more to mergers and acquisitions as a means to invest in the Chinese market. The typical
route for foreign investors into China is through equity or contractual joint ventures with
Chinese firms. Since the legal framework for mergers and acquisitions has been gradually
implemented, more foreign investors are inclined to consider this method in an effort to
improve market share. Another significant phenomenon is that Chinese companies have
begun to play an active role in the take-over of foreign companies. Shanghai Automotive
Industry's acquisition of Sangyong, the fourth largest carmaker in Korea, and Lenovo's
acquisition of IBM PC division are just the starting point of a new trend. Large Chinese
companies are no longer satisfied with domestic market share; they are aiming at worldwide
market share.
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